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Abstract: 
The relationship between intelligence and creativity remains controversial. The present research 
explored this issue by studying the role of fluid intelligence (Gf) in the generation of creative 
metaphors. Participants (n = 132 young adults) completed six nonverbal tests of Gf (primarily 
tests of inductive reasoning) and were then asked to create metaphors that described a past 
emotional experience. The metaphors were rated for creative quality. Latent variable models 
found that Gf explained approximately 24% of the variance in metaphor quality (standardized 
beta = .49), consistent with the view that creative ideation engages executive processes and 
abilities. The effect of Gf remained substantial after including personality (the Big Five factors) 
in the model. The discussion considers implications for the debate over intelligence and 
creativity as well as for the cognitive abilities involved in metaphor production. 
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Article: 
1. Making creative metaphors: the role of fluid intelligence in creative thought 
Are intelligent people more creative, or are intelligence and creativity independent abilities? This 
question is one of the enduring controversies in the psychology of creativity (Kaufman, 2009 and 
Wallach and Kogan, 1965). In the present work, we take a new slant on this problem by 
examining the role of fluid intelligence (Gf) in the production of creative metaphors. This work 
extends studies of creative cognition to a new domain, provides further support for our view that 
intelligence is central to creative thought (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a), and contributes to the 
emerging literature on how people make metaphors (Chiappe & Chiappe, 2007). 
2. The creativity-and-intelligence controversy 
In the psychology of creativity, most reviews of the creativity-and-intelligence controversy have 
concluded that creativity and intelligence are distinct abilities with minor overlap (e.g., Batey 
and Furnham, 2006, Kaufman and Plucker, 2011, Kim et al., 2010 and Runco, 2007). Since 
Wallach and Kogan's (1965) landmark work on this topic, research has typically found that 
creative cognition—usually measured with divergent thinking tasks—covaries modestly with 
intelligence. A recent meta-analysis of the relationship between intelligence and divergent 
thinking found an overall effect of r = .17 (Kim, 2005). 
 
At the same time, many contemporary researchers have found that there are good reasons to 
expect stronger relationships between intelligence and creative cognition. Generating creative 
ideas—ideas that are both novel and appropriate to the purpose at hand—requires identifying and 
implementing strategies for idea generation (Gilhooly et al., 2007 and Nusbaum and Silvia, 
2011a), exerting control over attention and thought (Vartanian, 2009, Zabelina and Robinson, 
2010 and Zabelina et al., 2012), making decisions and refining initial ideas (Finke et al., 1992, 
Gabora, 2005 and Vartanian, 2011), and inhibiting obvious and inapt ideas (Nusbaum & Silvia, 
2011a). 
 
If this view of creative cognition is right, then fluid and executive abilities should be central to 
the creative process. But past reviews and Kim's (2005) meta-analysis conclude otherwise, so an 
executive interpretation of creative thought is understandably controversial. We have suggested 
that some common methods in creativity research have obscured and deflated the true 
relationship between intelligence and creative cognition (Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011a, Silvia, 
2008a and Silvia, 2008b). First, analyzing latent variables instead of observed variables yields 
higher effects (Silvia, 2008a). Second, analyzing higher-order abilities—such as fluid 
intelligence (Gf) or g—yields stronger relationships than analyzing lower-order abilities and 
individual tasks (Silvia, 2008a). Third, and perhaps most important, newer methods of creativity 
assessment will yield larger effects. Our past work ( Silvia et al., 2009a and Silvia et al., 2008) 
has contended that the usual ways of assessing divergent thinking have serious problems. 
Divergent thinking tasks can be scored in many ways (see Plucker, Qian, & Wang, 2011), but the 
most common ways are to score the number of responses (fluency; e.g., Batey et al., 2009, 
Preckel et al., 2006 and Preckel et al., 2011) or to score the number of responses given by no one 
else (uniqueness or originality; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). Uniqueness is confounded with 
fluency (Silvia, 2008b), and it has an unusual sample dependency—it shrinks as the sample size 
rises ( Silvia, 2011 and Silvia et al., 2008)—that makes it poorly suited for large-sample 
research. 
 
As an alternative, we have suggested subjective ratings of creativity, which have been widely 
used in past work (Amabile, 1982, Christensen et al., 1957, Kaufman et al., 2008 and Kaufman 
et al., 2007). For divergent thinking tasks, several trained raters simply evaluate and score 
individual ideas (Silvia, 2011, Silvia and Kimbrel, 2010 and Silvia et al., 2008) or the set of ideas 
(Silvia et al., 2009). Thus far, we have found that subjective ratings of creativity are 
unconfounded with fluency (Silvia et al., 2008) and that the relationships of creativity with 
intelligence are substantially larger (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a). 
 
3. Cognitive abilities and metaphor production 
Metaphor provides an interesting context for studying the role of intellectual abilities in creative 
cognition.1 How people generate metaphors is fascinating in its own right—despite the large 
literature on how people understand metaphor (Gibbs, 1994, Glucksberg, 2001 and Glucksberg 
et al., 1997), little is known about how people make metaphors. Creative metaphors are also 
good examples of real-world creativity, so metaphor provides a fruitful context for studying 
creative thought. Unlike divergent thinking, which many critics contend is unrealistic and 
artificial (Sawyer, 2006 and Simonton, 1999), metaphors are a common and valued form of 
creativity in speech and writing (Plotnik, 2007). 
 
We propose that producing creative metaphors, like producing creative responses to divergent 
thinking tasks, involves several executive processes. The mechanics of metaphor production are 
just beginning to receive attention (see Chiappe and Chiappe, 2007 and Pierce and Chiappe, 
2009), but models of metaphor comprehension provide insight into how people might compose 
metaphors. In the property attribution model of metaphor (Glucksberg, 2001 and Glucksberg et 
al., 1997), metaphors entail attributing a property of a vehicle to a topic. In the metaphor “Some 
toddlers are tyrants,” for example, the “demanding and domineering” feature of the vehicle 
(“tyrants”) is attributed to the topic (“some toddlers”). To understand the metaphor, people create 
a superordinate “attributive category” (“things that are demanding and domineering”) that the 
vehicle exemplifies and that can plausibly include the topic. 
 
Using the property attribution model as a guide, we can see how creating a metaphor involves 
several executive processes. First, people must choose a property that they wish to attribute to 
the topic. For the topic “teaching,” for example, people must select what they wish to say about 
teaching (e.g., that it is rewarding, stressful, challenging, or unpredictable). Second, people must 
then scan semantic knowledge for suitable vehicles that exemplify the abstract, higher-order 
attributive category (e.g., searching for “things that are stressful”). Doing so requires maintaining 
access to the category while inhibiting many kinds of knowledge: features of the topic and of 
possible vehicles that are irrelevant to the higher-order category (cf. Gernsbacher, Keysar, 
Robertson, & Werner, 2001); highly accessible but irrelevant semantic knowledge (e.g., 
adjectival descriptions of the topic); and the many accessible but trite possibilities, such as 
idioms, clichés, and dead metaphors. Finally, likely vehicles (e.g., “lion taming”) must be 
evaluated according to abstract criteria (e.g., “Does this metaphor convey the desired meaning 
and emotional tone? Is it clever or interesting?”), revised, and then retained or discarded. 
 
Consistent with our analysis, the small body of work on how people make metaphors suggests 
that several cognitive abilities—including executive abilities—are involved. Taylor (1947) 
conducted one of the earliest studies of cognitive abilities and metaphor production. He 
developed a similes task that presented incomplete metaphor stems (e.g., “His skin was as brown 
as _____”) and required participants to complete the stem three different ways. The similes task 
loaded on ideational fluency and verbal versatility factors. Interestingly, Taylor suggested an 
executive mechanism for the verbal versatility factor (p. 251): 
 
“a person who is good in this ability can readily break the set of the first answer and produce a 
second answer, and then a third answer, that expresses the same general meaning. Others may 
find it difficult to break away from the first answer to restate the same idea in a somewhat 
different form.” 
 
Consistent with a role for interference management, the similes task had moderate correlations (r 
= .32 and r = .37) with measures of inductive reasoning. 
 
Guilford and his research group developed several metaphor completion tasks (e.g., simile 
insertion and simile completion) as part of their research on verbal fluency (Christensen and 
Guilford, 1963 and Merrifield et al., 1963). Similar tests appear in the Kit of Factor-Referenced 
Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976). Contemporary research has 
extended this assessment approach. In a recent study (De Barros, Primi, Miguel, Almeida, & 
Oliveira, 2010), people were asked to complete nine metaphors (e.g., “A camel is the _____ of 
the desert”) with up to four responses. Metaphor scores (primarily the number and quality of the 
responses) covaried with measures of analogical reasoning. 
 
A different method for assessing metaphor production—the figurative statement production task 
(Pierce & Chiappe, 2009)—presents people with a topic (e.g., “Some jobs are _____”) as well as 
a property to be attributed to the topic (e.g., “Confining and constraining, and make you feel like 
you are just putting in time”). People must produce a metaphor by generating a vehicle that 
successfully attributes the property to the topic (e.g., jails, prisons). In several studies, Chiappe 
and his colleagues (Chiappe & Chiappe, 2007, Studies 2 and 3; Pierce & Chiappe, 2009) have 
shown that working memory span—a cognitive ability central to reasoning and executive 
abilities (e.g., de Abreu et al., 2010, Kane et al., 2004 and Süß et al., 2002)—influences how 
people make metaphors. People with larger working memory spans generated better metaphors, 
and the effects of working memory were significant after controlling for individual differences in 
verbal fluency and vocabulary knowledge. 
 
4. The present research 
In the present research, we examined the contribution of fluid intelligence (Gf)—the ability 
associated with using “deliberate and controlled mental operations to solve novel problems that 
cannot be performed automatically” (McGrew, 2009, p. 5)—to the generation of creative 
metaphors. The sentence-completion tasks used in past work assess how people generate 
conventional metaphors—responses that are apt, familiar, and easy to understand, such as “Some 
lawyers are sharks” and “Some jobs are jails.” It's obviously important to understand 
conventional metaphors, but to assess how people generate creative metaphors—responses that 
are novel, original, and unfamiliar—different methods are needed. People can get high scores on 
sentence-completion measures by retrieving accessible and obvious vehicles, and most people 
will give the same handful of responses. To generate creative metaphors, in contrast, people need 
to inhibit such obvious responses and instead develop a response that few other people will give. 
It's thus likely that conventional and creative metaphors rely on different abilities, an issue we 
revisit in the General Discussion. 
 
To assess creative metaphor production, we asked people to generate two metaphors that 
described past emotional experiences. We emphasized that people should try to come up with a 
metaphor that was creative, clever, unique, and interesting rather than a conventional expression, 
dead metaphor, or standard idiom. These metaphors were rated for creativity by three raters who 
applied methods for subjective scoring that were developed and refined in other domains of 
creativity research (e.g., Kaufman et al., 2008 and Silvia et al., 2008). To measure Gf, we 
administered six tests of reasoning, primarily inductive reasoning (Carroll, 1993). All six tasks 
were essentially visual and spatial. By omitting Gf tasks with significant verbal aspects (e.g., 
verbal reasoning tasks), we can reduce superficial overlap between the Gf and metaphor tasks 
and thus provide a stricter test of their relationship. 
 
We also sought evidence for incremental validity of Gf, particularly with regards to personality. 
Some personality traits predict both intelligence and creativity, so they are potential “third 
variables” that should be examined (Silvia, 2008a). The most notable trait is openness to 
experience. Of the many personality traits that predict creativity, openness to experience has the 
largest and most consistent effects across a range of samples and tasks (Feist, 1998 and Silvia et 
al., 2009b). Moreover, of the five broad factors, openness to experience has the largest 
relationship with intelligence (Ashton et al., 2000, DeYoung, 2011 and Nusbaum and Silvia, 
2011b). We thus evaluated openness to experience as a possible “third variable” that might 
explain a relationship between Gf and the generation of creative metaphors. 
 
5. Method 
5.1. Participants 
The sample was comprised of 132 undergraduates—91 women, 41 men—at the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro. Students volunteered to participate and received credit toward a 
research option in a psychology class. One person skipped past both metaphor tasks and was 
excluded, leaving a final sample of 131 people. The self-identified racial and ethnic composition 
of the sample was primarily European-American (61%), African American (26%), Asian 
American (10%), and Hispanic/Latino (5%). (Participants could select more than one category, 
and approximately 6% did so.) 
 
5.2. Procedure 
The study was carried out in a group setting, with the number of participants ranging from 1 to 8. 
Upon entering the lab room, participants were given a consent form and a brief explanation of 
the study procedures. Following informed consent, students completed a series of fluid 
intelligence tests, a metaphor generation task, and some self-report questionnaires. The tasks and 
questionnaires were administered with MediaLab v2010. 
 
5.2.1. Fluid intelligence (Gf) tasks 
Participants completed six measures of fluid intelligence (Gf). Most of the tasks focused on 
inductive reasoning, and all of them were primarily non-verbal or spatial: (1) odd-numbered 
items from the Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices (18 items, 12 min); (2) a letter sets task 
(16 items, 4 min), in which people must decide which set of four letters violates a rule followed 
by the others (Ekstrom et al., 1976); (3) a number series task (15 items, 4.5 min), in which 
people must discern the rule governing a string of numbers to choose the correct number in the 
sequence (Thurstone, 1938); (4) the series task (13 items, 3 min) from the Culture Fair 
Intelligence Test (CFIT; Cattell & Cattell, 1961/2008), which involves choosing an image that 
correctly completes a series of images; (5) the matrices task from the CFIT (13 items, 3 min), 
which involves deciding which item completes the pattern in a matrix; and (6) a paper folding 
task (10 items, 3 min), in which people indicate what a piece of paper would look like after being 
folded, punched with holes, and unfolded (Ekstrom et al., 1976). 
 
5.2.2. Metaphor production task 
After completing the Gf tasks, the participants were asked to come up with two metaphors that 
described personal experiences. The experimenter first briefly defined and explained what 
metaphors were and gave examples of three common kinds of metaphor structures: metaphors 
(e.g., “All the world is a stage”), similes (e.g., “Justice is like a train that is nearly always late”), 
and compound metaphors (e.g., “Life is like a box of chocolates: you never know what you're 
going to get”). People were then given a prompt and asked to come up with a metaphor. We used 
two prompts. For the first metaphor, people were told “Think of the most boring high-school or 
college class that you've ever had. What was it like to sit through?”; for the second metaphor, 
people were told “Think about the most disgusting thing you ever ate or drank. What was it like 
to eat or drink it?” To help get them started, we provided several examples of stems for the first 
metaphor (e.g., “Being in that class was like…,” “That class was…”). People could spend as 
much time as they wished composing each metaphor—the software recorded the amount of time. 
Past work has found that intense autobiographical emotional experiences elicit relatively higher 
rates of novel metaphors (Fainsilber and Ortony, 1987 and Williams-Whitney et al., 1992). 
 
As in our divergent thinking research (Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011a and Silvia et al., 2008), we 
instructed people to “be creative.” Many studies have shown that measures of creativity are more 
valid when people are trying to generate creative responses (e.g., Harrington, 1975 and Niu and 
Liu, 2009). The participants were told that “the aim is to come up with something creative—
something clever, humorous, original, compelling, or interesting.” 
 
Three raters judged each metaphor independently: they were unaware of the other raters' scores 
and all information about the participants, including the participants' other metaphor. As a group, 
the raters had relatively high expertise and experience. They were graduate students conducting 
research on the psychology of creativity, and they had previous experience applying subjective 
scoring methods to divergent thinking tasks. For each prompt, the metaphors were identified by a 
random number and then sorted alphabetically. The raters scored each metaphor on a 5-point 
scale, anchored by 1 (not at all creative) and 5 (very creative). The single holistic score was 
based on several factors taken from our work on divergent-thinking scoring (Silvia et al., 2008): 
novelty (Was the metaphor original? Was it merely a cliché or a dead metaphor?), remoteness 
(Was the vehicle conceptually distant?), and cleverness (Was the metaphor interesting, funny, 
striking, or incisive?). Metaphors that received low scores tended to be common idioms that 
people retrieved from memory. For example, many people said that sitting through a boring class 
was like “watching paint dry” or “watching grass grow.” Metaphors that received higher scores 
tended to be original, clever, and elaborated, such as “Trying to stay awake during that class was 
like trying not to get seconds at an all-you-can-eat buffet” and “Eating escargot is the picky 
eater's death penalty.” 
 
5.2.3. Questionnaires 
After the metaphor task, people completed demographic items as well as the personality scales. 
We used the 60-item NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992) to assess 
the five major factors of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1997), including openness to experience. 
Each of the five factors is measured with 12 items, and people respond to each item using a five-
point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
6. Results 
6.1. Data reduction and modeling 
We examined the relationship between Gf and metaphor creativity using structural equation 
modeling. Gf was specified as a latent variable with six indicators (see Fig. 1). Each Gf task 
served as an indicator. The indicators were centered, and the variance of the latent factor was 
fixed to 1. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of this measurement model showed good fit: χ
2(9 df) = 14.19, p = .12, CFI = .955, SRMR = .047, RMSEA = .066 (90% CI = .00, .13). The 
reliability of a latent variable can be estimated with coefficient H, known as construct 
reliability or maximal reliability ( Drewes, 2000, Hancock and Mueller, 2001 and Silvia, 
2011). H ranges from 0 to 1 and expresses the “proportion of variability in the construct 
explainable by its own indicator variables” (Hancock & Mueller, 2001, pp. 202–203). For the 
Gf CFA, H was .76. 
 
Fig. 1. A depiction of the latent variable model for fluid intelligence and metaphor creativity. 
The ratings of the metaphor tasks (r1, r2, and r3) are ordinal and thus lack residual variances. 
Metaphor quality was specified as a higher-order latent variable defined by two lower-order 
latent variables: the “boring class” metaphor and the “disgusting food” metaphor. For 
identification, the two paths were constrained to be equal. In turn, each lower-order latent 
variable had each rater's scores as the three indictors (see Fig. 1). The variances for the latent 
variables were fixed to 1. The raters' scores were highly skewed, which is typical for ratings of 
creative products. We thus modeled the ratings as ordinal variables, which avoids violating the 
assumption of multivariate normal indicators (Kline, 2010, Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004 
and Yang-Wallentin et al., 2010). An ordinal CFA has the virtue of properly modeling the 
indicators, but one limitation is that it doesn't afford the conventional indices of model fit.2 
Reliability was good for both the “boring class” ratings (H = .86) and “disgusting food” ratings 
(H = .67). 
 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics and correlations. All analyses were conducted with Mplus 6.1 using maximum likelihood 
estimation with robust standard errors. All regression coefficients are standardized. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 M SD Min, 
Max 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1
9 
1. Ravens 9.99 3.25 0, 16 1                   
2. Paper 
folding 
5.23 2.28 1, 10 .50 1                  
3. Series 
completion 
7.93 1.52 4, 11 .42 .42 1                 
4. Matrix 
completion 
6.46 1.05 4, 9 .19 .31 .28 1                
5. Letter sets 8.79 2.48 3, 14 .31 .33 .29 .20 1               
6. Number 
series 
8.03 1.99 4, 14 .31 .25 .24 .10 .42 1              
7. Neuroticism 2.82 .66 1.00, 
4.58 
.05 .02 − .1
2 
− .0
9 
.16 .05 1             
8. Extraversion 3.57 .52 1.83, 
4.67 
− .0
9 
− .1
6 
− .1
2 
− .1
4 
− .0
7 
.03 − .2
1 
1            
9. Openness to 
experience 
3.35 .51 2.17, 
4.67 
.23 .10 .16 − .0
6 
.03 − .0
2 
− .0
4 
− .0
9 
1           
10. 
Agreeableness 
3.52 .48 2.17, 
4.58 
.01 .03 .12 .11 .00 .04 − .2
2 
.10 .06 1          
11. 
Conscientiousn
ess 
3.48 .50 2.00, 
4.92 
− .1
8 
− .0
2 
− .1
7 
− .0
8 
− .0
8 
.00 − .2
6 
.30 − .2
3 
.17 1         
12. Boredom: 
rater 1 
1.40 .74 1, 4 .23 .09 .10 .00 .04 .10 − .0
7 
− .0
4 
.32 − .0
6 
− .0
9 
1        
13. Boredom: 
rater 2 
1.28 .60 1, 4 .27 .16 .13 − .0
1 
.13 .10 .09 − .1
2 
.09 .09 − .1
6 
.3
4 
1       
14. Boredom: 
rater 3 
2.24 1.05 1, 4 .19 .17 .20 − .0
5 
.17 .03 .11 − .2
1 
.21 − .0
8 
− .2
6 
.5
4 
.2
7 
1      
15. Disgust: 
rater 1 
1.29 .56 1, 3 .20 .12 .08 − .0
7 
.04 .14 − .0
2 
− .0
6 
.16 .15 .01 .1
5 
.1
7 
.0
9 
1     
16. Disgust: 
rater 2 
1.35 .69 1, 4 .12 .12 − .0
1 
.04 .03 .05 .10 − .1
1 
.06 .08 − .0
7 
.1
3 
.0
9 
.2
0 
.1
9 
1    
 M SD Min, 
Max 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1
9 
17. Disgust: 
rater 3 
1.86 .85 1, 4 .16 .10 .00 .07 .11 .21 .20 − .0
6 
.00 − .0
9 
− .1
3 
.1
2 
.1
6 
.2
0 
.2
8 
.3
6 
1   
18. Boredom 
time 
105.7
5 
73.7
2 
17.30
, 
556.2
9 
.16 .18 .09 .01 .06 − .0
1 
− .1
0 
− .1
7 
.18 .19 − .1
1 
.2
5 
.3
0 
.2
0 
.2
8 
.1
4 
.1
7 
1  
19. Disgust 
time 
96.72 76.4
1 
16.66
, 
632.3
3 
.10 .09 − .0
4 
− .0
9 
− .1
3 
− .0
9 
− .0
3 
− .3
2 
.22 .09 − .0
9 
.1
9 
.3
4 
.2
8 
.1
5 
.1
5 
.1
6 
.4
7 
1 
Note. n = 131. The time scores are in seconds. The latent variable models treated the raters' scores as ordinal variables (see text for details), so analyses based on the covariance 
matrix will vary slightly. Researchers interested in reanalyzing the data can obtain the raw data and Mplus input files from the first author. 
6.2. Role of Gf in metaphor creativity 
Did Gf predict how well people came up with creative metaphors? Our first model, shown in Fig. 
1, estimated the effect of Gf on metaphor creativity. Gf had a significant effect, β = .49, p = .011 
(see Table 2). Furthermore, the effect size was large, using the benchmarks of .10 for small, .30 
for medium, and .50 for large (Cohen, 1988). Gf explained 24.3% of the variance in metaphor 
creativity scores. 
Table 2. Summary of the regression effects. 
Model Predictor Standardized 
beta 
Standard 
error 
pvalue 95% 
Confidence 
interval 
1. Gf only Gf .49 .19 .011 .11, .87 
2. Gf and 
personality 
Gf .41 .20 .038 .02, .79 
 Neuroticism .14 .18 .435 − .21, .49 
 Extraversion − .07 .14 .594 − .35, .20 
 Openness to 
experience 
.26 .14 .063 − .01, .53 
 Agreeableness − .05 .15 .742 − .34, .24 
 Conscientiousness − .18 .16 .256 − .50, .13 
Note. n = 131. 
6.3. Incremental validity 
Did Gf continue to predict metaphor creativity after controlling for personality? We estimated a 
model in which Gf and the five factors of personality were predictors of metaphor creativity. The 
five factors were modeled as observed variables. As shown in Table 2, Gf continued to have an 
effect that was both significant and medium-to-large in size, β = .41, p = .038. None of the five 
factors had a significant effect, but openness to experience had a marginal effect. The largest 
effects were associated with openness to experience (β = .26, p = .063) and conscientiousness (
β = − .18, p = .256). Consistent with the large literature on personality and creativity, openness 
predicted higher creativity and conscientiousness predicted lower creativity ( Batey and 
Furnham, 2006 and Feist, 1998). As a set, Gf and the five factors explained 34.8% of the 
variance in metaphor creativity scores. 
6.4. Additional descriptive analyses 
People could spend as much time as they wished on each metaphor, so how long did they 
spend? Table 1displays the descriptive statistics for time (in seconds). In general, people spent 
about a minute and a half on each metaphor, but the variability was large. As Table 1 shows, 
time ranged from around 17 s to around 10 min per metaphor, and people's time spent writing the 
first metaphor correlated significantly with time spent on the second (r = .47, p < .001). 
To examine the relationship of time with metaphor creativity, we formed a latent variable from 
the two time scores and constrained the two indicator paths to be identical. The latent time 
variable was highly correlated with metaphor creativity (r = .70, p < .001)—the worst metaphors 
were generated the fastest. Time was only modestly related to Gf (r = .14, p = .282), however, so 
the effect of Gf on metaphor could not merely be due to spending more time on the tasks. 
Instead, time was significantly predicted by several factors of personality. A regression model 
with the five factors as predictors and time as the outcome found significant effects for 
extraversion (β = − .37, p < .001), openness to experience (β = .23, p = .009), and 
agreeableness (β = .20,p = .012). 
Finally, we explored the role of gender in metaphor creativity. In our sample, men received 
significantly higher scores on the metaphor task, β = − .70, p = .031. Because gender is a binary 
predictor, the coefficient is Y-standardized: it represents the difference in metaphor quality, in 
standard deviation units, between the two groups (Long, 1997). 
7. General discussion 
People high in fluid intelligence (Gf) made metaphors that were much more creative. The size of 
the effect (β = .49) is particularly notable in light of the lack of surface overlap between the 
domains—the Gf tasks were essentially non-verbal—and the cultural stereotype of metaphors as 
literary devices that would ostensibly not have much to do with reasoning abilities. From our 
perspective on intelligence and creative cognition, however, one would expect substantial 
contributions of fluid and executive abilities (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a). Producing an original 
metaphor involves choosing an abstract property to attribute, searching knowledge for a vehicle 
that has the abstract property, and evaluating and revising the resulting metaphor. Throughout, 
there is substantial interference from metaphor-irrelevant features of both the topic and vehicle 
(Gernsbacher & Robertson, 1999) as well as from highly accessible idioms, dead metaphors, and 
adjectives. Searching knowledge based on an abstract criterion and managing interference both 
entail executive processes (Unsworth, 2010), so we would expect a significant contribution of Gf 
to the quality of creative metaphors. 
 
The empirical debate about intelligence and creativity has taken place, for the most part, within 
the domain of divergent thinking. Divergent thinking is central to creativity, in our opinion, 
because many real-world creative problems involve generating many ideas and then reworking 
them. At the same time, many critics have argued that the tasks are artificial (Sawyer, 2006). As 
Simonton (1999) put it, “creativity in music, for example, is not going to be very predictable on 
the basis of how many uses one can imagine for a toothpick” (p. 314). This perhaps misses the 
point—in cognitive research, artificial tasks are useful for understanding how mental processes 
operate—but it is nevertheless important to understand how people generate realistic creative 
products. 
 
Unlike divergent thinking, metaphor is an uncontroversial example of real-world creativity: it is 
valued in writing and speaking, and many books on creative writing try to teach people how to 
generate creative and interesting metaphors (e.g., Plotnik, 2007). Our metaphor production task 
also varied from divergent thinking tasks in several ways: divergent thinking tasks are usually 
timed (cf. Wallach & Kogan, 1965) and encourage people to generate many brief ideas, whereas 
the metaphor task is untimed and encourages people to generate a single elaborated idea. By 
showing a substantial effect in a different creative domain, the present work further suggests that 
the long-standing notion that creativity and intelligence are independent abilities should be 
revisited (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011a). 
 
The exploratory analyses of time shed some light on how people generate metaphors. First, the 
fact that people who took longer came up with better metaphors is consistent with the kinds of 
cognitive processes that are employed. People with brief response times appeared to use a 
memory-based retrieval strategy (Gilhooly et al., 2007), in which they searched memory for an 
appropriate metaphor and then wrote it. Because this strategy yields things people have seen and 
heard before, it typically yields common idioms and clichés. People who took their time, in 
contrast, appeared to be developing an answer on-the-spot, which takes more time but yields a 
more original result. Second, the relationships between time and personality suggest different 
ways of engaging with the task. People high in extraversion took less time, consistent with 
extraversion's impulsive quality. It would be interesting to know if people high in extraversion 
spent less time generating an idea, revising and evaluating the idea, or both. In contrast, people 
high in openness to experience spent more time. Research shows that people high in openness to 
experience enjoy opportunities to use their imaginations and to be creative (Joy, 2001 and Joy, 
2005), facts that fit with choosing to spend more time developing clever metaphors. 
 
To extend the present work, future research on metaphor production should examine a broader 
range of factors within the Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) model (Carroll, 1993 and McGrew, 
2005). In particular, crystallized intelligence (Gc) and broad retrieval ability (Gr) seem like 
important factors. Gc, whether viewed as verbal ability or as acquired knowledge (Kan, Kievit, 
Dolan, & van der Mass, 2011), should be important to metaphor generation, given the highly 
verbal nature of the task. Moreover, Gr would seem to be important, given that creating a good 
metaphor involves scanning and manipulating stored semantic knowledge, from simple 
vocabulary to conceptual knowledge of possible topics and vehicles. Some studies have found an 
important role for Gc in creative thought (e.g., Greengross et al., 2012 and Sligh et al., 2005), but 
for the most part research on intelligence and creativity hasn't examined the range of CHC 
cognitive abilities. Including Gf, Gc, and Gr in the same study could clarify their unique 
contributions to creative metaphor production, and it would allow the estimation of a higher-
order g factor and its effects. 
 
Another fruitful direction for future research is to compare the role of cognitive abilities in 
creative and conventional metaphors. Most research on metaphor production prompts people to 
generate brief metaphors that are highly conventional and apt, whereas our task encourages 
people to generate an unconventional metaphor. It's likely that the cognitive processes and 
abilities differ across these tasks. People can successfully produce conventional metaphors (e.g., 
“Some jobs are jails”) by retrieving accessible semantic knowledge, including obvious tropes, 
clichés, and idioms. For creative metaphors, in contrast, people must usually inhibit the most 
obvious instances of a feature as well as accessible idioms and dead metaphors. Factors such as 
Gc and Gr may thus be relatively more important for conventional metaphors, whereas factors 
such as Gf may be relatively more important for creative metaphors. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Unconventional and clever metaphors are among the most creative uses of language, but the 
study of creative metaphor has received little attention. By showing strong effects of fluid 
intelligence on metaphor creativity, the present research extends the study of intelligence in two 
directions: it shows that Gf strongly predicts creativity in a domain other than divergent thinking, 
and it suggests that the Cattell–Horn–Carroll model of cognitive abilities could be fertile for 
understanding cognitive aspects of metaphor production. 
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